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Introduction 
This paper aims to provide policy-makers, prison 
governors and prison and probation staff with 
information on current practice and issues relevant to 
managing Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs) and 
individuals considered at risk of engaging in violent 
extremism in a prison and probation context (1). The 
paper is structured around these two contexts. While in 
practice this distinction may not exist in some EU 
Member States, it serves to identify key issues: prison 
conditions and reintegration strategies, risk assessment, 
prison regime choices, rehabilitation and reintegration 
initiatives, and staff training.
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1
) The working paper develops a previous working paper under a different title. Radicalization Awareness Network, 
'Dealing with Radicalisation in a Prison and Probation Context Ran P&P - Practitioners Working Paper' (2015). 
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This paper also aims to provide guidance and to help support decision-making processes, both at policy, 
and at prison and probation management levels. It is therefore written for accessibility rather than 
comprehensiveness. A one-size-fits-all solution does not exist because EU Member States vary in many 
ways, including in legislation and how prison and probation systems are organised (2). However, multi-
agency cooperation is crucial in the management of risks related to radicalisation and to ensure that VEOs 
are provided with opportunities for rehabilitation.  
Since the launch of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2012, the Working Group on Prison and 
Probation (RAN P&P) has focused on preventing violent extremism, engagement with extremist groups and 
extremist behaviour during detention and probation. This paper is based on practitioners’ input and up-to-
date research on the subject, although research in this area remains limited due to the relatively small size 
of the population concerned. The RAN P&P Working Group comprises 250 practitioners, including 
representatives from probation services, prison governors, prison officers, Ministries of Justice and 
intelligence services, and NGOs and civil society organisations working with offenders. RAN P&P has 
convened 13 meetings with practitioners from all EU Member States (including three study-visits to prisons 
in three different countries) and leading researchers, enabling high-quality exchanges on a range of 
themes (3). These meetings have highlighted a range of promising practices in prison and probation 
contexts, which can be consulted the RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices (4).  
Practitioners and policy-makers face enormous political and public pressure to ensure public safety. 
Regardless of these pressures, RAN P&P maintains the following guiding principles that are reflected 
throughout this paper: 
 the safety of society is best ensured through promoting the well-being and rehabilitation of offenders; 
 terrorism crimes cover a range of activities; individuals sentenced for terrorist acts do not all 
represent the same risk to society; 
 offenders are capable of positive change and they need support to disengage from violent 
extremism; 
 universal human rights must be upheld at all times and under all circumstances; 
 promoting positive staff-prisoner relationships and healthy prison climates is a pre-condition for 
reducing risk around radicalisation and contributing to rehabilitation and reintegration;   
 multi-agency cooperation is crucial to prevent radicalisation and support desistance processes. 
 
This working paper concerns those convicted or on remand for terrorist-related offences and those 
considered to be at risk of radicalisation in prison and probation contexts.  
                                                          
 
(
2
) United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization 
to Violence in Prisons," (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, October 2016). Global Counterterrorism 
Forum, "Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders," 
(Rome2012). 
3
 Summary papers of these events are available online.  
(
4
) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-
practices/index_en.htm  
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It has become incumbent (and sometimes a legal requirement) upon  Member States to prevent acts of 
terrorism within public institutions such as prisons  and individuals at risk of radicalisation fall within this 
remit. In this report, we emphasise that these types of offenders are diverse and include individuals who 
have not committed acts of violence and who may never do so. Being radical does not mean that a person 
will in any way follow up with violent action. Any response to radicalisation needs to recognise this 
diversity. We also recognise that effective management of Violent VEOs and those considered at risk of 
radicalisation requires multi-agency cooperation. It is crucial that offenders receive continuous support and 
that information flows between organisations, including prison and probation services, police, and 
community organisations. 
Did you know? 
Violent extremist offenders - a special case? EU Member States currently have a range of opinions and 
approaches to VEOs and issues around radicalisation. Some normalise the risks associated with VEOs (e.g. 
Italy, through its rehabilitation approach which is not tailored to VEOs) and radicalisation, while others 
treat these risks as requiring special structures and/or processes (e.g. the United Kingdom Healthy Identity 
programme, targeting VEOs specifically) (5). 
 General Approaches: There is overlap between theories of desistance from crime and desistance from 
terrorism; it is important to provide for vocational and social support as required, alongside specialist 
approaches(
6
).  
 Specialist Approaches: Offenders’ individual circumstances may lead them to require unique 
approaches. For example, individuals who have committed violence with ideological motives, have 
experienced trauma after fighting in a foreign conflict or developed specialised combat skills, or have 
network ties with extremist groups, may require specialist interventions and processes. These specialist 
approaches may include unique psychology- and/or religion-based interventions. 
 
Context 
The context of terrorism has changed dramatically for prisons and probation. ‘Foreign terrorist fighters’ (7) 
now account for the highest proportion of arrests and convictions in Europe (Table 1). The number of 
arrests has tripled over the last three years, putting increased strain on prisons and probation as offenders 
                                                          
 
(
5
) United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization 
to Violence in Prisons." 
(
6
) Adam Calverley, Cultures of Desistance: Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Ethnic Minorities (Taylor & Francis, 2012); 
Stephen Farrall, Understanding Desistance from Crime: Emerging Theoretical Directions in Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation, ed. Adam Calverley (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2006). 
(
7
)'Foreign terrorist fighters' are defined by the UN Security Council (resolution 2178) as '…nationals who travel or 
attempt to travel to a State [other than their own territory or state]… for the purpose of perpetration, planning, or 
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training in connection with 
armed conflict'. This includes individuals leaving Europe and travelling to Syria, Iraq, Mali or Ukraine. 
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move through criminal justice systems. According to Europol, Jihadist terrorism and foreign fighters 
represent the largest proportion of arrests in the EU over the past three years (Table 1) (8).  
Other types of terrorism, including ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, plus left-wing and anarchist 
terrorism, are on the decline. Concerns over right-wing extremism have however grown as polarising and 
nativist social and political discourse fuel acts of violence against Muslims and migrants by reactionary 
movements, individuals and small groups. These tensions are expected to continue increasing for the 
foreseeable future. This complex social and political climate is reflected in prisons, and adds to the diverse 
populations and tensions that require managing.  
A range of activities are now considered terrorism offences, many of which are non-violent and therefore 
represent a limited risk to society. 'Lesser risks' include those associated with fundraising, intention to 
travel, or possession of material considered extremist. The characteristics of those committing the offences 
have also changed; the population is younger, more diverse, and includes more women. Practitioners 
report that the radicalisation process can be remarkably short, as little as two weeks, and that recruitment 
can occur in prison(9) . 
Did you know? 
Special terminology? Agreeing on terminology is helpful for describing specific processes and interventions. 
Particularly in multi-agency settings, a shared language can help different parites understand each other 
and cooperte. The extent to which this language is also used when working with the offenders themselves 
should be considered carefully.  
 'Disengagement' refers to behavioural change, such as leaving a group or changing one’s role within it.  
 ‘De-radicalisation’ refers to a cognitive shift in understanding and outlook that moves individuals away 
from legitimising violence (
10
).  
 In some instances, using (the term) 'de-radicalisation' may lead to inappropriate labelling and 
stigmatisation, which can be harmful. 
 
With some VEOs receiving short sentences, criminal justice systems have a limited window in which to 
affect the process of change. Because these periods for intervention are brief, continuity as an individual 
moves from prison to the community is crucial, and should involve multi-agency cooperation as needs are 
                                                          
 
(
8
) Europol, 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat), ' (The Hague: European Union, 2016). 
p.18. 
(
9
) Research, however, has not documented a single recruitment process. United Nations, 'Handbook on the 
Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons',  p. 114. For a 
discussion of the complexities around radicalisation in prison, see Alison Liebling, Helen Arnold, and Christina Straub, 
'An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Relationships at Hmp Whitemoor: 12 Years On', (Cambridge: Cambridge Institute of 
Criminology, Prisons research centre, 2011); Alison Liebling and Helen Arnold, 'Social Relationships between Prisoners 
in a Maximum Security Prison Violence Faith and the Declining Nature of Trust', Journal of Criminal Justice 40 (2012). 
(
10
) See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-exit/docs/ran_exit-ex_post_paper_london_15-
16032016_en.pdf online. 
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assessed and support provided. Family support mechanisms and partnering with third sector NGO’s  should 
be explored. Probation services will play an important role in designing these alternatives to rehabilitation 
in prison settings. The numbers of foreign fighters expected to come into contact with the judicial system 
also raises questions over interventions pre-trial and during the trial itself (11). Member States are currently 
exploring ways of preventing 'detention damage', and in some cases are making available alternative 
sanctioning options for less serious offences.  
Table 1. 
Year 2013 2014 2015 
No. individual arrests in the EU for terrorism-related offences 537 774 1077 
No. individuals arrested for jihadist terrorism 216 395 687 
No. convictions for terrorist offences 258 345 417 
No. acquittals for terrorist offences 78 107 110 
Source: Europol (12) 
The challenge posed by VEOs and radicalisation is uneven among EU Member States, but it is clear that the 
number of VEOs is rising rapidly across the EU as a whole, with 258 convictions for terrorist offences in 
2013 and 417 in 2015 (Table 1). France (424), Spain (187), the UK (134), and Belgium (61) reported the 
highest number of arrests in 2015.   
Monitoring procedures are currently in place in many EU Member States (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK) to manage risks associated with offenders who are not convicted of 
terrorist-related crimes but who are at risk of committing violent extremist acts or influencing others to do 
so. Data on the numbers of individuals being monitored over concerns linked to violent extremism are not 
always reported by Member States, and are subject to frequent fluctuation. The figures that are available 
show that in the England and Wales, 600 individuals are being monitored while in Italy, 124 individuals in 
prison are being monitored. These monitoring procedures, while prudent, raise legal, resource, and ethical 
issues: how can risk be monitored appropriately without stigmatising individuals as 'extremist' and 
contributing to further alienation? 
Did you know? 
Reducing risk through support: prisons and probation have a duty of care towards individuals in custody, 
including care for the vulnerable. Those convicted of extremist offences, and those seen to be at risk of 
radicalisation need support at crucial times. Managing VEOs and persons suspected of becoming radicalised 
towards violence or influencing others towards a violent extremist mindset should not over-emphasise risk 
at the cost of meeting individuals’ needs and providing support.  
 
                                                          
 
(
11
) Global CounterTerrorism Forum, 'Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison 
Radicalization' (2015). 
(
12
) Europol, 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat) '; 'European Union Terrorism Situation 
and Trend Report (Te-Sat) ', (The Hague: European Union, 2014); 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend 
Report (Te-Sat) '; 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat) '.  
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Key recommendations 
- 'Terrorist offences' and the individuals who commit them are growing in range and do not all present the 
same risks to society. Responses should be proportionate; otherwise there is a risk of ‘detention 
damage’ among individuals, of fuelling the radicalisation process through disproportionate measures.   
- All EU Member States have general rehabilitation programmes targeting different types of offenders. 
Whether VEOs should have access to specialised programmes should be explored. Decisions should be 
based on individual risks and needs, the policy perspective on dealing with VEOs, the proportionality of 
designing specialised programmes versus the size of the target group, and the potential risks of 
stigmatisation doing more harm than good.   
- Multi-agency cooperation is necessary to ensure informed decision making about interventions (through 
information sharing) and to ensure intervention continuity from prison to the community. It should include 
representatives from at least the prison, probation, police, community organisations, social and health 
services and the family.   
 
Prison context 
Healthy prison environments 
Research suggests that radicalisation in a prison environment is rare but that prison conditions can play a 
significant role in heightening or lessening risks (13). Recent terrorist attacks across Europe have been 
committed by individuals with a criminal past (14). The prison environment includes the physical 
environment and values, relationships, procedures and policies that constitute the day-to-day functioning 
of a prison. These factors shape the prison experience and can provide opportunities to reduce both the 
risk of radicalisation during imprisonment and the risk of reoffending after release into society. 
Overcrowding, a lack of staff or poor relationships between staff and prisoners, and poor facilitates — 
including poor access to meaningful activities such as education and work — can have a negative impact on 
prisoners. Underpinning 'dynamic security' (15) is a holistic approach to a healthy prison environment that 
includes the following dimensions (16): 
Staff-prisoner relationships: Prisoners must be treated with dignity, respect and courtesy at all times. Good 
relationships involve care for the vulnerable as well as help and assistance. Effective staff-prisoner 
relationships contribute significantly to the safety and security of staff, prisoners and the public by 
smoothing the flow of information and improving its quality. Good relationships between VEOs and staff 
can facilitate the building of trust and help break down 'us' versus 'them' barriers and the distrust and 
suspicion towards 'the authorities' often seen amongst people with an extremist mind-set. Therefore 
                                                          
 
(
13
) Mark S. Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat (New York: New 
York University Press, 2013). 
(
14
) Simon Cottee, "Reborn into Terrorism: Why Are So Many Isis Recruits Ex-Cons and Converts," The Atlantic, 25 
January 2016. 
(
15
) See https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC_Handbook_on_Dynamic_ 
Security_and_Prison_Intelligence.pdf online. 
(
16
) Alison Liebling, Prisons and Their Moral Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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investing in effective day-to-day interaction between staff and prisoners is a key element of dealing with 
VEOs.  
Well-being and personal development: Offenders’ well-being and development must form the core of 
rehabilitation in prison. Ensuring this involves meeting baisc needs (access to decent food, clean sanitary 
facilities, time outside) and providing vocational training so that prisoners may pursue personal 
development. Access to education, creative endeavours such as art and music, and a space for practicing 
and developing a religious faith are all important avenues for encouraging personal development and 
minimising distress.  
Conditions and family contact: Prison conditions encompass facilities to maintain personal hygiene and 
decency, a clean living space, and access to and respect for cultural and religious considerations through 
processes and facilities. For instance, body searches and searches conducted by dogs must be performed in 
a way that respects cultural and religious norms. Family contact is a crucial form of support for prisoners 
and contributes to healthy relationships after release. Frequency of contact with family, a meaningful space 
for visits that includes comfortable spaces for children, and an appropriate time allocated for meaningful 
contact are all important for family contact. Family bonds are important for the reintegration of VEOs as 
they can be (although not in all cases) a positive driving force for rehabilitation.  
Security, safety and control: An organised, controlled and efficient prison provides prisoners with a 
structure that meets expectations and allows them to feel safe. A lack of structure and inconsistencies in 
security and control can negatively impact prisoners’ experiences, and safety needs may be met through 
other means, including groups (e.g. religious groups, gang-like groups) that offer protection. These groups 
can enhance and entrench prisoner hierarchies (sources of status) and conflicts between groups of 
prisoners, heighten risks in prisons and decrease perceptions of safety. Understaffing or inexperienced 
personnel have a negative impact on security and control.  
Did you know? 
Placing trust appropriately encourages a safe and nurturing staff-prisoner culture: intelligently placed 
trust is crucial for security and control, fostering good relations between staff and prisoners. It is also 
crucial for the rehabilitation of prisoners. Not trusting individuals can damage their self-esteem and can 
have a negative impact on offenders’ capacity to see themselves as trustworthy and to reintegrate into 
society. A well-run prison must be grounded in intelligent trust: trusting prisoners who are trustworthy and 
allowing opportunities for those considered untrustworthy to build trust. Heavy-handed or punitive 
policies, as well as poor staff-prisoner relationships, can erode trust, contribute to alienation, legitimise 
extremist views against the state, undermine efforts to rehabilitate and jeopardise safety.  
Professionalism: Professional staff apply rules and distribute privileges fairly and equally. They also 
communication prison rules and expectations clearly. Professional discretion should be exercised to ensure 
that punitive practices are enforced only when other options have been exhausted. Staff should 
communicate clearly with prisoners so that they understand why certain disciplinary actions are being 
taken towards them and are aware of what behaviour they need to change. Professionalism involves equal 
treatment of VEOs and others offenders. Professionalism might be tested by offenders. VEOs with a strong 
ideological inclination and trust issues towards authorities may test staff by explicitly 'dehumanizing' them 
(e.g. calling them dogs) and targeting their personal views and opinions. Prison staff need to be trained and 
 
 
 
8 Radicalisation Awareness Network 
RAN Working Paper 
Second Edition - 2016 
 
offered supported to help them recognise this behaviour and to understand how to respond to it 
professionally. 
Did you know? 
Professionalism requires fairness (legitimacy): fairness involves just processes and just outcomes. Just 
processes imply quality decision-making procedures and fairness in the way people are personally treated 
by prison and probation staff. Just outcomes imply that individual groups are treated equally and fairly. 
Favouring or disadvantaging one group can decrease the legitimacy of the prison. Singling out one group, 
such as Muslim offenders or terrorist offenders, can reinforce an 'us' versus 'them' divide (e.g. 'the state is 
against Muslims') and erode the legitimacy of the prison and the state, reinforcing extremist ideology.  
It is important to consider that different ethnic and religious groups have different experiences (e.g. in 
relation to discrimination, marginalisation, Islamophobia, or racism) and that that recognising equality and 
diversity avoids reinforcing these experiences and causing harm. Research has shown how unhealthy prison 
environments can create the conditions that contribute to radicalisation and can more broadly contribute 
to negative outcomes for all offenders (17), including the heightened levels of distress that lead to 
suicide (18). 
Did you know? 
‘Difficult’ prisoners and the prison environment: problematic prisoner behaviour can be linked to the 
prison environment. Unfair treatment, poorly organised regimes, or frustrations around contact with family 
are all circumstances that may influence a prisoner's behaviour. Research has shown that difficult prisoners 
may be difficult in some environments but not in others(19), suggesting that challenging behaviour – 
including behaviour related to radicalisation – must be considered alongside in relation to the prison 
regime.  
 
Key recommendations 
- A healthy prison environment is the primary deterrent for radicalisation. The risks of radicalisation are 
reduced through a professional, secure and fair prison. The absence of these elements can reinforce the 
extremist mind-set and distrust towards authorities, and increase both the formation of groups and 
triggers for violence.  
- Investing in day-to-day staff-offender relationships, through staff empowerment, professionalism, respect 
and dynamic security measures, is key to dealing with VEOs.   
 
                                                          
 
(
17
) Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat. 
(
18
) Alison Liebling, Suicides in Prison (London: Routledge, 2002). 
(
19
) Roy D. King and Kathleen McDermott, "'My Geranium Is Subversive': Some Notes on the Management of Trouble 
in Prisons," The British Journal of Sociology 41, no. 4 (1990). 
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Risk assessment and support 
EU Member States are currently inconsistent in how they use the results of intelligence and risk 
assessment, and how they collect information. Approaches range from professional judgement to formal 
risk assessment tools.  
Risk evaluation and assessment currently take two forms:  
 information gathering, monitoring and analysis;  
 specific risk assessment tools used for VEOs and those suspected of being radicalised or influencing 
others.  
Member States are encouraged to follow the guiding principles outlined on page 1.  
Did you know? 
What is subversive behaviour? in an effort to prevent violent extremist acts, more attention has been 
given to identifying non-violent extremist behaviours that may be a precursor to violence either inside or 
outside of prison. This has raised significant issues for staff who are tasked with identifying behaviours of 
concern. Spotting risks related to radicalisation is also difficult in a prison environment. The line between 
'prison behaviour' (resistance, power struggles, or joining a group for protection) and 'extremist behaviour' 
(committing violent acts), is often blurred. Structured individual assessments and trained staff can help 
assess risks, motivation, and prisoner needs more accurately.  
Procedures are currently in place in several Member States (e.g. Belgium, France , Italy, the Netherlands, , 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom) to detect radicalisation. These procedures include intelligence 
gathering and reporting(20). Intelligence is crucial to the safe functioning of prisons, but monitoring for 
extremism is subject to false positives. We therefore recommend four sets of considerations to assist 
decision-making linked to intelligence:  
(1) if intelligence is used to inform decision-making, including placement of prisoners in special units, it 
must be used in accordance with legal frameworks and human rights;  
(2) the intelligence systems around the 'target group' must be multi-levelled: they must recognise 
degrees or levels of risk or threat (e.g. in relation to capability, intent and engagement) and must 
specify whether this threat relates to the offender him/herself, prison officers, other prisoners, or the 
public;  
(3) intelligence must be used in a dynamic way, allowing for individuals to have their risk lowered and for 
intelligence to be dismissed if invalid or out of date;  
(4) intelligence must be contextualised: individuals who prompt concerns and security intelligence 
around radicalisation must have this information contextualised and embedded within other sources 
of information. This contextualised understanding should include:  
 accounts from persons with personal or close knowledge of the offender that can provide context 
and understanding of him/her, for example, a chaplain or a prison officer; 
 actuarial data: about the individual and the offence;  
                                                          
 
(
20
) Global CounterTerrorism Forum, VPrison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison 
Radicalization'. 
 
 
 
10 Radicalisation Awareness Network 
RAN Working Paper 
Second Edition - 2016 
 
 dynamic factors: such as employment, housing, mental health, family support, etc.; changes in 
these factors in particular may triggers increased risk, or mitigating circumstances that reduce 
risk;  
 clinical factors: professional judgement and experience, using personal and professional 
experience to assess the information collected through interviews and file reading;  
 information from partners in a multi-agency framework, such as from social workers, the police, 
and intelligence services, about an individual. 
Some Member States (e.g. Sweden) have a dedicated prison intelligence organisation. An often-heard 
complaint from prison directors is the lack of sharing between prisons and intelligence services. Having a 
dedicated prison intelligence organisation can allow for information sharing protocols that make it easier 
for general intelligence services to inform prisons about offenders who might have started a process of 
radicalisation.  
Did you know? 
Radicalisation and religious behaviour: for religiously inspired extremism, it is very important not to 
confuse people who might have (re)discovered their faith with people who have developed radical views. 
Most people who convert or revert, e.g. to Islam, during imprisonment are doing so for peaceful individual 
motives or to bond with a group of other prisoners. Prejudices around links between religion and 
extremism remain very present and may hamper accurate risk assessment. Staff diversity and awareness 
training helps to avoid confusion between the two.  
Several formal risk assessment tools are currently used in a number of Member States to assess the risk 
believed to be associated with people suspected or convicted of violent extremism (21). Risk assessment for 
radicalisation, however, is currently in its infancy. An accurate assessment must consider the range of 
motivations and circumstances that contribute to radicalisation, which will differ between offenders and 
may include existential needs for belonging, ideological commitments, financial incentive, or glorification of 
violence (22). As they have a focus on violent extremism, these risk assessments are designed to be 
implemented next to general risk assessments and other instruments used to assess the overall risks and 
needs of offenders.  
Assessments are limited in value if they are not carried out frequently. They must be treated as a 
continuous activity aligned with professional judgements. Risk assessment tools can be used for a variety of 
reasons, including assessing the needs of the offender and informing appropriate placement, programmes 
and support.  
                                                          
 
(
21
) These include the Vera 2 instrument, the REM (Risk Assessment Extremism for Managing), and the ERG22+ 
(Extremism Risk Guidance). See D. Elaine Pressman and John Flockton, 'Violent Extremist Risk Assessment: Issues and 
Applications of Teh Vera-2 in High-Security Correctional Setting', in Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in 
Managment, Radicalisation and Reform, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Routledge, 2014). RAN P&P Visit Penitentiary 
Institute, Vught 26 November 2015. Monica Lloyd and Chris Dean, 'The Development of Structured Guidelines for 
Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders', Journal of Threat Assessment and Management 2, no. 1 (2015).  
(
22
) United Nations, 'Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of 
Radicalization to Violence in Prisons', p. 42.  
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Did you know? 
Radicalising influences: determining whether someone is attempting to influence another person into 
adopting violent extremist behaviours is a major challenge within today’s context of concerns. Influencing 
others assumes intention to coerce someone into violence and assumes that someone is willing to adopt a 
violent position and behaviour. Risk management practices must be mindful to separate risks from 
individuals coercing others to adopt extremist attitudes from other forms of social interactions. Peer groups 
in prisons may provide opportunities for prosocial mentorship. Risk management practice must also be 
mindful of vulnerable individuals who may be subject to bullying and coercion.  
Risk assessment tools should not be used as predictive tools to gauge an individual’s future threat or 
behaviour. The use of these tools could have several harmful effects, including labelling individuals as 
'extremists', contributing to alienation, and potentially decreasing the legitimacy (fairness) of the 
prison (23). This is why it is crucial to thoroughly and repeatedly assess each individual. paying attention to 
their personal, social and environmental circumstances (24). An emphasis on risk assessment and detection 
should not come at the expense of supporting offenders by providing for safety, personal development, or 
opportunities for family contact.  
In order to recognise positive and negative change, it is important that assessments are repeated at regular 
intervals or at times of change. This is crucial for documenting and understanding reductions in risk level 
that a particular offender may show as his/her disengagement process evolves, and for decision-making 
transparency with regard to, for example, programmes and placement.  
Did you know? 
Charismatic Leadership: the level of social prestige enjoyed by prisoners can be determined by a range of 
factors. Research has shown that prisoner status arises from what is imported into the prison (crime 
hierarchies) and what is considered valuable within a prison context for lessening the pains associated with 
imprisonment (e.g. social bonds). Leadership among prisoners must be understood within the wider social, 
material, and moral climates of prisons. Recent research found evidence of prisoner hierarchies emerging 
in a tense prison environment with poor staff-prisoner relationships, and of the leader bringing balance, 
stability and order to the wing (25).  
                                                          
 
(
23
) Alison Liebling and Ryan J. Williams, 'The New Subversive Geranium: Some Notes on the Management of 
Additional Troubles in Maximum Security Prisons', British Journal of Sociology  (in press). 
(
24
) United Nations, 'Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of 
Radicalization to Violence in Prisons',  p. 42.  
(25) Alison Liebling et al., 'Locating Trust in a Climate of Fear: Religion, Moral Status, Prisoner Leadership, and Risk in 
Maximum Security Prisons — Key Findings from an Innovative Study', (Prisons Research Centre, Institute of 
Criminology: University of Cambridge, 2015). 
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Key recommendations 
- Monitoring and intelligence sharing tools for radicalisation and recruitment are needed to assess the risk 
and threat level of VEOs (to themselves, other offenders, staff and the public); organising this within the 
prison system may enhance cooperation with police and general intelligence services; 
- Specialized risk assessment tools are needed for violent extremists; information should be collected from 
multiple sources and care must be taken to reduce assessor bias;  
- Specialised risk assessment tools should complement other risk and needs assessment tools and 
approaches;  
- Risk assessments must be completed regularly so that changes to risk levels are clear; the assessments 
must take account of the personal, social and environmental circumstances of the offender;  
- Risk assessment protocols need to be appropriate for the complexity / size of the process / population, 
resource level and staff capabilities within a Member State;  
- With regard to rehabilitation, risk assessment should include an assessment of needs — both general as 
well as those specific to dealing with an extremist mind-set (e.g. more contact with family, development 
of religious understanding, more contact with other prisoners or staff members who can positively 
influence the VEO).  
 
Prison regime choices: concentration, dispersal or a combination 
EU Member States currently use one of three regime types to manage VEOs and individuals considered 
either at risk of radicalisation or of influencing others (26).Not all VEOs are located in high-security prisons 
(some do not have high Security prisons), and some Member States have dedicated prisons for VEOs 
charged with or convicted of terrorist crimes (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain). Policy and 
practice are shifting rapidly in this area, with countries exploring different regime choices (England and 
Wales, for instance, are considering moving from a dispersal model to a special unit, while France 
experimented with special units in 2016). This section explores differences between prison regimes 
following the concentration, dispersal or combination models, and the challenges and benefits of each. 
Figure 1 details part of the decision-making process involved in these regime choices. 
Containment Model: VEOs and people suspected of radicalisation are placed in separate units — 
sometimes these smaller units follow a similar regime, sometimes they have unique regimes that help staff 
manage specific risks and behaviours (see considerations for special units). Containment models may 
'concentrate' VEOs and suspects together or they may serve as special units for different types of 
individuals with problematic behaviour (that is, not just VEOs). The containment model is, initially, an 
opportunity for VEOs entering the prison system, but it is also an option for individuals not convicted for VE 
offences if their behaviour is linked to radicalisation (see 'entrance criteria', p.13).  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
(
26
) Roy D. King and Sandra L. Resodihardjo, 'To Max or Not to Max', Punishment & Society 12, no. 1 (2010). 
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Figure 1. Decision-making flow chart for three models of imprisoning VEOs and radicalised offenders 
 
Did you know? 
'Entrance criteria' for special units: the criteria must be met to enter special units. The criteria should 
consider: the basis on which decisions are made on moving an individual to a special unit; the exact criteria 
used; the ways in which problematic behaviours associated with radicalisation are similar to or different 
from other problematic behaviours found in a prison environment; the transparency of decisions;whether 
they are subject to legal challenge; and whether the decisions align with human rights. 
Advantages: containment allows the close monitoring of behaviours and interactions. Through training, 
staff can become highly specialised in working with this population and interventions can be focused on 
their needs. VEOs are separated from the mainstream population and this avoids shifts in the power 
hierarchy and the exertion of any influence from VEOs on violent extremism. The containment model also 
ensures that VEOs and those considered at risk of radicalising others do not directly recruit or influence 
others in the mainstream population. In addition, to the public it is a very 'visible' way in which to deal with 
VEOs.  
Containment Model 
(Special Units) 
Dispersal Model Combination 
Model 
Purpose-built 
processes and 
structures 
Existing 
processes and 
structures 
Problematic 
behaviour 
Non-
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Conviction / Sentencing / Remand  
Release 
Entrance 
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Disadvantages: placing VEOs together may strengthen social bonds and contribute to a culture of 
opposition between prisoners and staff, undermining staff efforts to build relationships and trust. These 
social dynamics may further entrench an oppositional mindset between 'us' and 'them' and reinforce views 
that the state is against individuals. Grouping by similar religious or ethnic group may also reinforce views 
held inside prison and within society more generally about the unfair treatment of particular religious or 
ethnic groups, legitimising grievances. The units could be a source of stigma and status (see 'special units' 
below), subverting their aims by damaging offenders' self-image or making the units desirable placements; 
in both cases, undermining rehabilitation efforts. The approach treats all extremist offenders as equal in 
degree and severity of risk, despite a range of activities included under the heading of 'VE offences', 
including those related to fundraising, travel, and violence. The cost of purpose-built facilities and regimes 
are high, and there is little research to determine how well such units are working. (Early) experiences of 
special units, for example in the Netherlands and France, show the difficulty of finding good staff. When 
incidents occur (e.g. staff are wounded), positions in special wings become much less attractive. As the 
range of terrorist offences is growing, so is the diversity of risk and needs of offenders (male / female, 
different offences, different ideological backgrounds) within the special wing. Upholding a single security 
regime that works despite these differences has proved difficult.  
Did you know? 
The challenge of 'special units': locating VEOs and persons considered at risk of radicalising others in 
special units raises issues around stigmatisation and status. Special units risk entrenching risk-labels 
assigned to these individuals, hindering rehabilitation opportunities. They can also contribute to group 
bonding among prisoners and undermine rehabilitation efforts. Special units can serve as a source of 
status, as being sent to a special unit marks a prisoner off as distinct from other prisoners and could be 
seen as a marker of prestige. The case for using special units rather than the existing processes and 
structures for managing problematic behaviour must be clearly articulated in each context.  
Dispersal Model: VEOs and people suspected of radicalisation are placed among the mainstream prison 
population and fall under the same general regime. Under this approach, there is an effort to normalise 
VEOs within the mainstream population — although security regimes may differ for these offenders. 
Problematic behaviour among VEOs and mainstream prisoners whose behaviour relates to radicalisation 
can be managed through existing procedures. Problematic prisoners may warrant special placement in line 
with prison procedures.  
Advantages: as prisoners are placed among mainstream populations, they are not subject to the same 
sources of stigma or marginalisation that follow from placement on a special unit. Similarly, the issues 
around the status derived from being placed on a special unit do not arise. There may be opportunities for 
VEOs to change their attitudes and behaviour through interactions with the mainstream prisoner 
population. The financial costs of this approach are likely to be lower compared to special units.  
Disadvantages: no specialized staff are employed, and General staff may not be trained to fully understand 
either the population or markers of risk. Risks around extremism are more difficult to identify among 
mainstream prisoners as these risks  are part of a host of other social dynamics and risks to order and 
control. There are also concerns that dispersing VEOs throughout the general population will heighten the 
potential for radicalisation among others, and will provide opportunities for crime cultures to intermix.  
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Did you know? 
‘Exit criteria’ from special units: there should be clear criteria for moving people out of special units. Key 
considerations include: If special units are used for problematic prisoners and VEOs, what considerations 
are given for offenders to move out of these units? Is an ‘exit criteria’ specified, or are special units used for 
the duration of offenders’ sentences? Opportunities should be provided for prisoners to modify their 
behaviour and to have these changes recognised.  
Combination Model: People suspected or convicted for violent extremist acts are placed either in a 
separate or ordinary regime, depending on risk assessment and the behaviour of the individual prisoner.  
Advantages: A combination model provides flexibility and adaptability to the risks and needs of individuals.  
Disadvantages: The criteria and risk assessment tools for determining appropriate placement are imprecise 
(see Risk assessment and support). A combination model is costly as staff training and specialist resources 
are needed.  
Table 2. Summary of Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of Regime Choice 
Regime choice Potential Advantages Potential Disadvantages 
Containment  -Close monitoring -New and stronger bonds forged among prisoners 
 -Limited effect on mainstream population -Eroded trust between staff and prisoners 
 -Focused interventions -Entrenched oppositional mindset 
 -Specialised staff - Perceptions of unfairness reinforced 
 -Reassuring to public safety   -Labelling effects, stigmatisation 
  -Status associated with being on a special unit 
  -All VEOs assumed to be of equal risk 
-Difficulties finding staff  
  -High financial cost  
Dispersal  -Less stigmatisation and marginalisation -Generalist staff, training costs 
 -No status derived from placement on special unit -Difficult to ensure high quality of intelligence 
 -Opportunities for positive influence from others -Challenges in knowing prisoners and dynamic security  
  -VEOs may exert influence over others 
  -VEOs may be influenced by criminal gangs 
Combination  -Tailor-made response to individual needs/risks -Selection criteria /risk assessment is imprecise  
 
Key recommendations 
- Prison regime choices should be guided by the aim to normalise VEOs whilst minimising the risks to the 
VEOs themselves, other prisoners, staff and the general public.  
- The pros and cons of different models of prison regime available for managing the risks around 
radicalisation must be carefully considered and weighed against the individual needs of offenders. For 
prisoners demonstrating concerning behaviour linked to radicalisation, special units may be necessary 
but their use must be guided by clear entrance and exit criteria, and they must operate within the legal 
frameworks of the country concerned. 
- Differentiation within special units is important for tailoring security and rehabilitation efforts to different 
levels of risks and needs in relation to the level of the offence, gender and ideological background.  
- Regardless of regime choice, prisons must be equipped with a means of assessing the most appropriate 
placement for prisoners, and have suitable staff training provisions (generalist or specialist).  
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Rehabilitation interventions  
Using existing structures and processes for individualized sentence plans: There are few rehabilitation 
interventions in place in prisons specifically for VEOs and those suspected of radicalisation. Issues around 
radicalisation are usually addressed through existing structures and processes, and these are individualised 
for each offender as part of his or her sentence plan (27). Behaviour is addressed through psychological 
interventions, chaplaincy activities, education and employment, and good relationships between staff and 
prisoners. Taking a broad and holistic approach recognises that desistance from VE is a multifaceted and 
often unique journey. Vocational training whilst in prison is significant in preparing offenders for release 
and desistance. Offenders with shorter sentences present fewer opportunities for intervention in prison.  
Specialist psychological interventions: There are only few examples of specialist interventions targeting 
VEOs directly (28). Those that do exist  are psychologically driven and are conducted one-on-one or in small 
group settings. The need for specialist interventions depends on the particularities of each individual. 
Experience suggests that individual interventions might be harder to finance. During group interventions, 
participants are often less 'honest', especially regarding their own situation and views. The potential 
disruption of group dynamics (e.g. charismatic radical 'leaders' who challenge the facilitator) must also be 
taken into account.  
Theological education and pastoral support: Chaplaincy provisions can help with religious education and 
support. Chaplains not only provide religious education, but in the case of violent Islamist ideology, can also 
challenge particular views and provide opportunities for detainees to think about issues in a different way. 
However, opportunities for participating in chaplaincy activities vary across EU Member States according to 
resources, the demographics of each prison, and the State’s position on religion. Specialist theological 
interventions, including dialogue sessions, as found in Muslim majority states, are rare among EU Member 
States. Care and guidance at times overlap with deradicalisation and preventive aims, for example when 
providing alternative theological perspectives, but security should not be a chaplain’s primary focus. If 
chaplains are involved in disengagement / deradicalisation efforts, they should be experienced and trained 
to do so. The fact that they are religiously educated does not suffice for specialist interventions with VEOs.   
                                                          
 
(
27
) United Nations, 'Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of 
Radicalization to Violence in Prisons',  p. 42.  
(
28
) Christopher Dean, 'The Healthy Identity Invervention: The UK's Development of a Psychologically Informed 
Intervention to Address Extremist Offending', in Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Managment, 
Radicalisation and Reform, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Routledge, 2014). 
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Did you know? 
Religion in prison and the State (29): the existence of chaplaincy departments for VEOs and individuals 
potentially concerned by radicalisation differs across EU Member States. France, for instance, does not 
formally recognise Muslim chaplains as part of the prison system, whereas in England and Wales chaplains 
are formally employed by the State and are increasingly involved in risk assessment (30), although this has 
not been without controversy as it can erode the trust of prisoners (31). It is important that chaplains are 
respected by prisoners and that their role is clearly separate from security so that they can maintain 
prisoners’ trust and provide both pastoral and spiritual care, and guidance.  
Social Support: Providing opportunities for offenders to maintain close ties with networks of family and 
friends is crucial to bridging the transition from prison to release. Research on desistance among criminals 
in general, and among VEOs specifically in relation to deradicalisation and dis-engagement, supports the 
importance of social ties in these processes. Interventions such as mentor projects can also be used to 
provide social support and help build trust-based relationships, for example with staff, community 
members and NGO professionals. It is important to assess whether the family and social circle are partners 
in a disengagement process and as opposed to stimulators of the extremist mindset. If the latter is true, 
social support should be provided through other channels (in line with legal and human rights regulations). 
Key recommendations 
- Rehabilitation interventions should be supported by both risk and needs assessments, while sentence 
plans for VEOs must include tailor-made intervention plans. These can be based on existing structures if 
in place, but may also include specialist interventions.  
- Psychological interventions can take place in a one-to-one or group setting. Although more expensive, 
one-on-one interventions should take priority over group interventions because of the potential negative 
impact on group dynamics in the latter. 
- Providing religious and spiritual support is key and may have a disengaging effect on VEOs with 
religiously motivated ideologies. However, if chaplains are intentionally involved in disengagement / 
deradicalisation efforts, they should be experienced and trained in this area. Their credibility and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the offender and wider community should be considered.   
- Social support is important for disengagement and for eventual release. Working with family and friends 
as partners in a disengagement process is effective if the social circle was not a factor in the 
radicalisation process in the first place. Other avenues of social support (e.g. mentor programmes or 
community involvement) must also be considered.  
 
 
                                                          
 
(
29
) Ryan J. Williams and Alison Liebling, 'Faith Provision, Institutional Power and Meaning among Muslim Prisoners in 
Two English High Security Prisons', in Religion in Prison, ed. Kent Kerley (Praeger, in press). 
(
30
) James Beckford, Daniele Joy, and Farhad Khosrokhavar, Muslims in Prison: Challenges and Change in Britain and 
France (Basingstoke, England & New York: Palgrae MacMillan, 2005). 
(
31
) Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Stephen Pattison, and Mansur Ali, Understanding Muslim Chaplaincy (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 
2013). 
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Staff training and support 
 As European society in general has become more diverse and complex, so too have prisoner societies. 
Sensitivity and understanding of cultural and religious norms, values and expressions has become 
increasingly important for good staff-offender relationships. It is not necessary for all staff members to be 
experts on specific ideologies or religions. It is, however, necessary that correctional officers have some 
background knowledge of the religious and cultural backgrounds of the people they are working with. 
Prejudice, uncertainty and fear of offenders can lead to over-reporting and negative interactions with 
prisoners and can contribute to marginalisation and create an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust. 
General training: A certain level of staff professionalism is necessary if training on the specific topic of 
radicalisation is to be effective. More specialised training of all frontline prison and probation staff should 
include understanding the circumstances that can lead to violent extremism (see Risk assessment and 
support, page 9). All frontline prison and probation staff should be trained to recognise processes of 
radicalisation. We emphasise that this approach should not look for 'signs' of radicalisation, as these are 
frequently subject to false positives and misunderstanding. Rather, what is needed is knowledge of the 
individual offender and an understanding the role of unsafe prison environments (see 'healthy prison 
environments', p.6), including a lack of support resources and avenues for the pursuit of personal 
development and hope. Staff must be mindful of hostility between staff and prisoners, as well as among 
prisoners, and must pursue their work with VEOs and others at risk of radicalisation whilst exercising 
respect, fairness and empathy.  
Specialist Training: Staff working directly with convicted terrorists need a specific skill set and not all staff 
members will be suitable. Training will typically cover a range of professional practices, including: 
understanding pathways to violent extremism, recognising radicalization warning signs and features of 
positive regimes, carrying out intelligence assessment, following ethical standards, interpersonal skills, 
stress management, and religious and cultural diversity (32). 
Specialist staff can usually be divided into two categories: regular officers who work on a specialised wing 
or unit (e.g. a terrorist wing) and those who collate information from other experts (these can be social 
workers, psychologists, etc.). These specialist staff will carry out assessments and manage 
interventions/programmes. Support is needed for these specialist staff, who are often engaged in a 
struggle for the 'moral high ground' and need to build trust with offenders.  
A sensible approach would be to offer general-awareness training to all staff, and specialist training to staff 
working directly with incarcerated terrorists. Staff members should be supported in managing their anxiety 
and being confident about their decisions, both those based on results from the assessment tool and on 
their professional insights. A support structure should be put in place involving colleagues, psychologists 
and prison management. A training and support unit at the national level should be established to update 
and disseminate training course material and offer support to staff and governors. A national-level training 
                                                          
 
(
32
) United Nations, 'Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of 
Radicalization to Violence in Prisons',  p. 30. 
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and support unit should also connect with other Member States to share best practice models and training 
materials.  
Key recommendations 
- Staff training must include the topic of diversity to improve understanding prisoners of different cultural 
and religious backgrounds as so to enable staff to understand which behaviours and practices are 
potentially linked to radicalisation, and which are not. 
- Staff should be trained to understand radicalisation and as well as individual, social and environmental 
reasons for prisoners’ behaviour. Looking for 'signs' of radicalisation should be done within the broader 
context of recognising prisoners' vulnerable points and needs for support. Staff need to understand the 
process and not just look for 'signs'.  
- Generalist training should be made available for all, and specialist training is needed for different staff 
roles and in proportion to the prisoner population considered at risk.   
- A national training and support unit for prison staff can help with the dissemination of training material, 
development of better training practices, and levels of psychological support offered to staff. It can also 
strengthen cooperation at local, national and international levels and facilitate the sharing of best 
practices and training material.  
Probation context 
Services responsible for offenders in post-release contexts bear an increasing burden as they seek to 
manage risks related to violent extremism while ensuring that offenders are supported and reintegrated 
post-release. With the definition of terrorist-related offences having broadened while sentences have 
become shorter (less than four years,with some serving as little as two weeks), there may be very little 
opportunity to rehabilitate offenders in prison. The diversity of offenders, who include youngsters and an 
increasing number of women convicted for terrorism-related offences, requires consideration and unique 
approaches. In this new context, multi-agency cooperation is necessary between prisons, probation (or 
equivalent), police and community service providers to ensure that information is shared and that 
offenders and ex-offenders are provided with the necessary interventions and support structures. Multi-
agency cooperation and planning for release must begin well in advance of the release date, preferably at 
least six months earlier, to ensure that information exchange is enabled and continuous, and that support 
services are in place.  
Releasing and reintegrating VEOs: general good practice  
Reintegration aims to prevent violent behaviour and enable inclusion and participation in society. A sense 
of belonging and acceptance makes commitment to violence less sustainable. Radical ideas are not 
dangerous in themselves, even though they may remain a risk factor for violent behaviour in some 
circumstances. There is limited research on VEOs post-release, and little is known about what helps 
resettlement. However, as a matter of good practice: 
Resettlement plans: Plans should be included in the working agenda for the offender as early in the 
sentence as possible. Risks and needs assessments are a key tool to design effective reintegration 
programmes. Probation services (or national equivalent) should cooperate on this assessment during the 
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final stage of the prison sentence. Such multi-agency cooperation can provide guidance on how best to 
shape the reintegration process.  
Transition management: Transitional periods are those points in time when the risk of recidivism is high, 
and when it is important to have plans in place prior to full sentence being served. These plans should 
incorporate ways to deal with a problematic home or personal life, and make use of human and social 
capital in order to reduce the likelihood of new offences.  
Individualized risk and needs assessments: Understanding the individual and responding to their unique 
circumstances and challenges is important, as is facilitating the desistance and / or deradicalisation process 
by recognising a potential to contribute to society. Multi-disciplinary teams are recommended to evaluate 
offenders’ individual needs and risks.  
Capacity building: Planning for the end of support and building capacity for an individual to rely on others 
and to cope, including social and organisational support (see below), is critical.  
Trust: Trust is central to effective probation work, and often the process of matching extremist offenders 
with probation officers is carried out with the building of trust in mind. Probation officers who share a 
cultural or religious background with the offender may help to foster trust.  
Social and organisational support — co-producing desistance with others: Theories of desistance — those 
that seek to understand how individuals cease or desist from crime — suggest that desistance is co-
produced with others. These 'others' would include correctional officers and additional persons in social 
networks. Representatives of other collaborating organisations, including community organisations that 
help with job-seeking or religious or spiritual guidance, and social services, should serve to meet social 
support needs and decrease sources of risk. Friends, family members and other significant others and 
meaningful relationships are crucial for desistance trajectories and for reinforcing a positive view of non-
violent behaviour as well as a positive identity. People who are assumed to have some authority over the 
offender, such as religious leaders, teachers, or people who formerly held the same beliefs and attitudes 
but have desisted from violent behaviour and could now serve as mentors, may also be a positive influence. 
Did you know? 
Promoting human good: the ‘Good Lives Models’ (GLM) is a strengths-based and positive approach to 
desistance and rehabilitation. It recognises that reducing criminological needs is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition, for effective interventions. The GLM takes a constructive and broader account of 
human good — 'experiences, activities, states of affairs that are strongly associated with the well-being and 
higher levels of personal satisfaction and social function' (33). This broader account of the person that 
includes their hopes, goals and sense of purpose, is crucial to facilitating desistance processes for offenders 
convicted of terrorism-related offences.  
Positive relationships are crucial to supporting desistance and / or de-radicalisation processes and these 
should be facilitated through relationships. The aim of these relationships should be to: 
                                                          
 
(
33
) Tony Ward and Shadd Maruna, Rehabilitation (Taylor & Francis, 2007). p. 21.  
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- provide support as any criminogenic needs (those needs that directly relate to the likelihood of 
someone committing a crime, e.g. lack of certain skills) are identified through appropriate 
assessment tools; 
- offer support as the problems that offenders themselves define as central to their situation and as 
potential reasons for violent behaviour; 
- help offenders recognise and realise their potential strengths, capabilities, skills etc. and channel 
them appropriately; 
- offer suggestions and opportunities for participating in the community, such as through cultural or 
sports groups; 
- support the offender in realistically defining a 'good life' and finding ways of practically attaining that 
vision; 
- stimulate a redefinition of an offender's identity through positive feedback that supports hope, 
belonging and reintegration. 
 
Key recommendations 
- Offenders must have continuity of support from prison to release, especially in view of the shorter 
sentences that terrorist-related crimes now incur, and because it is the transition periods that pose 
the highest risk for recidivism.  
- Multi-agency cooperation is crucial to ensuring a fluid transition from prison to the community and to 
maximising opportunities for offenders to have their needs accurately assessed and met. This 
cooperation should be part of post-release planning and involve a multi-disciplinary team.  
 
(Specialist) Interventions 
 
Interventions, support structures and risk management practices may be specially designed for VEOs or 
they may be more generalist in approach, for example, by ensuring vocational opportunities and facilitating 
family support (34). Whether a specialist approach is taken will depend on the needs of the offender. Some 
Member States (e.g. France, the Netherlands, UK) have voluntary programmes, making a range of possible 
interventions possible: 
- Offenders must have continuity of support from prison to release. The first few weeks for 
offenders after release are the point at which ex-offenders are most vulnerable. Adjustment can be 
difficult for both ex-offenders and his or her family. One way to ensure this continuity is to provide a 
mentoring or facilitator arrangement with offenders pre- and post-release. He or she should work 
with the individual throughout the sentence and should remain a point of contact and support after 
release.  
- Providing for the material and social support needs of VEOs: Structured cooperation with 
service-providers like housing agencies, employment agencies, educational institutions, health care 
providers and family services are crucial to providing ex-offenders with opportunities for reintegration 
and rebuilding lives post-release. This must be built into resettlement plans prior to release, along 
with any social needs. Building and supporting relationships, developing positive social bonding, 
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) Radicalisation Awareness Network, 'Ex Post Paper Ran Exit' ed. RAN P&P (Amsterdam2016). 
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supporting and stimulating personal strengths and skills, encouraging hope, and offering guidance in 
religious and spiritual matters are also important for reintegration into society and for an offence-free 
lifestyle. The exact forms of support will depend on the internal and external needs of the offender. 
Because of the stigma attached to terrorist offences, providing this kind of support might prove more 
difficult for VEOs (see 'Barriers to reintegration', p.23).  
- Interventions in cooperation with the offender’s social network. Desistance research has shown 
the importance of strong social ties in the encouraging offenders to adopt a crime-free lifestyle. 
Involving an ex-offender’s social network, especially the family (
35
) in interventions provides crucial 
support for desistance processes. This may include involving family members in professionals’ 
decision-making about the ex-offender, giving them tasks or responsibilities to help the ex-offender, 
and providing training that prepares them to deal with their loved one when the intervention stops. 
Those within an offender’s social network who are a negative influence should not be involved, but 
care should be taken when identifying such negative influences. Promising practices in this area may 
be inspired by the 'social net of benefits' approach used with juvenile offenders on remand or close 
to release, who have their networks of significant others organised around them in support. 
Everyone signs a contract that is agreed upon by the offender. The binding contract places 
responsibility with the offender's network and this serves as a social safety net. Austria is 
experimenting with this. 
- Theological interventions and support from religious communities. Such specialist 
interventions may be offered in prison and post-release. Religious communities, including volunteers 
and imams, play an important role in supporting offenders post-release, while a lack of social and 
spiritual support can increase vulnerability post-release. Offenders may benefit from general 
religious counselling or from tailored religious and theological interventions. Specialist interventions 
may be underpinned by either a theological approach where the aim is to counter specific ideological 
beliefs, or may take a cognitive-behavioural approach. Practitioners should seek to use these 
community resources as part of a network of support that is available to aid the ex-offender in his or 
her desistance and reintegration journey. As with mentoring schemes and working with family 
members, appropriate risk assessments should be carried out for individuals involved.  
- Mentoring programmes. Some EU Member States (Denmark, UK) have a mentoring system in 
place for radicalised individuals who want to leave violent extremism (
36
) . These mentors, who serve 
as role models and guides within society, can be trained volunteers. Some might be 'formers', with a 
past as a violent extremist and experience of leaving the scene (
37
). They are familiar with the 
situation in which the person finds him or herself, can offer guidance on pathways out of extremism 
and showcase alternative lifestyles. Other mentors may come from religious or community 
organisations and may support the offender in any number of ways, including day-to-day help (e.g. in 
completing job applications). Vetting mentors to make sure there are no hidden agendas and having 
a good matching process between mentor and offender are key to success.  
- Mental health services. Increasingly, data and experience support some sort of connection 
between radicalised offenders (and radicalised individuals in general) and mental health issues. 
                                                          
 
(
35
) Basia Spalek, 'Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation in Relation to Families: Key Challenges 
for Research, Policy and Practice', Security Journal 29, no. 1 (2016). 
(
36
) Basia Spalek and Lynn Davies, 'Mentoring in Relation to Violent Extremism: A Study of Role, Purpose, and 
Outcomes', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 5 (2012). 
(
37
) Global Counterterrorism Forum, 'Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of 
Violent Extremist Offenders'.  
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Mental health services and assessments are needed in prison and post-release to ensure that the 
individual receives the support needed. 
 
Key recommendations 
- A range of specialist and generalist approaches should be available for supporting VEOs post-
release, such as material and social support schemes, family and friends support initiatives, religious 
counselling, dialogue sessions, mentoring programmes and cooperation with mental health services.  
- Initiatives should cater to the individual needs of the offender and include attention to material, 
economic, social, spiritual and religious needs. 
Barriers to reintegration  
Research has long recognised that an offender faces significant difficulties in becoming a 'requalified 
citizen' once released from prison, and that these difficulties take many forms, including economic, 
relational and emotional. Individuals convicted of terrorist offences face additional barriers. There are 
unique sources of stigma associated with terrorist offences, and in some contexts this negative label may 
be appropriated and serve as a badge of status in marginalised communities.  
Stigmatisation: The stigmatised offender will experience challenges in terms of accessing social support 
and opportunities to reintegrate, including access to employment or education. At all points, professionals 
working with VEOs must recognise their potential to become reintegrated into society, and must provide 
support as they seek to achieve this goal. Upholding prejudices towards the offender can entrench barriers 
and reinforce oppositional and radicalised identities.  
Trust: It is crucial that professionals work towards building and maintaining trust with the ex-offender and 
with wider segments of the public. Distrust of communities or community organisations can reinforce 
perceptions of unfairness among community members. Member States’ probation services (or equivalent) 
can benefit from building strong relationships of trust with community organisations. This ensures that 
multiple sectors of society maximise the opportunities for offenders post-release.   
Release conditions: Conditions can be quite strict for these offenders, and go beyond those set for other 
types of offenders. This may hamper reintegration if, for example, offenders are easily recalled to prison for 
their breach. Practitioners however may also use these conditions, and the more frequent contact they 
imply, as an opportunity to work with offenders and respond to their needs.  
Staff Training 
Probation work with VEOs has a marked effect on probation workers above and beyond ordinary probation 
work. The social and political climate in relation to extremism heightens stress levels for those working with 
offenders, while policies can change quickly and may be guided by political considerations rather than what 
is known to be best for the offender. There is a low risk acceptance with VEOs, meaning that the 
consequences of making mistakes with this group  will be heavily scrutinized by political leadership and the 
general public. This can restrict the professional judgement of probation officers. The officers can find their 
work under intensive political scrutiny, and balancing social and political pressures with what may be best 
for the offender’s needs for reintegration represents a fine balance. This is not expected to change for the 
foreseeable future.  
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Specialised training is needed for probation workers to accurately assess the needs of offenders (see'staff 
training and support', p.18). Ideology may or may not be the main driver for the offender, and specialist 
training and experience is needed to understand and assess when ideology should be taken into account, 
and when other ways of addressing offender behaviour should be explored. Probation workers are also in 
need of support through debriefings, stress management training, and through co-worker and 
management support.   
Key recommendations 
- Offenders convicted of terrorism-related offences face unique challenges in re-entry into the community 
because of stricter conditions, stigmatisation and trust issues. These must be planned for prior to release 
and addressed alongside material needs (employment, education, housing); 
- Staff face extraordinary pressure in working with this category of offender and require access to training 
and support in order to perform their role effectively.  
 
Working paper conclusions 
The challenges ahead for prison and probation practitioners working with VEOs are both growing and 
shifting. As increasing numbers of individuals are being held in prison for terrorism-related offences, there 
is a growing need to respond appropriately to the risks and needs of these offenders and to prepare them 
for release into society.  
Further challenges stem from a shifting political context and insecurity from terrorism threats, so it will be 
of critical importance to understand and maintain best practices. Member States will need to allocate 
limited resources in a way that contributes to general improvements in the overall prison climate as well as 
more specialist interventions for monitoring and managing risks and contributing to rehabilitation and 
resettlement of VEOs. These decisions will be informed by the number of individuals presenting a risk and 
the type of radicalisation under consideration (including religious inspired, far right, left wing, or 
separatist). 
Practitioners across Member States are growing in confidence and competence in this area. There is 
recognition that investing in high-quality day-to-day interactions between staff and prisoners — dynamic 
security — is a positive step towards minimising the risks of radicalisation. There is also a move towards 
normalising VEOs, although not all countries are faced with the same degree of risk, and some are unable 
to normalise some VEOs due to the risks that they present to the prisoner population and/or the public. 
Specialised risk assessments and interventions are now being piloted and used in a dynamic way to 
evaluate the needs and risks of offenders. The best practices in this area are individualised and responsive 
to the needs of the offender.  
Further precision is however needed. Practices are constantly changing across EU Member States which has 
made identifying countries using particular practices very difficult. The reasoning behind decisions that lead 
to particular policies and practices being adopted needs to be more transparent and fed into a broader 
knowledge base of best practices.  
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Moreover, the evidence base remains thin. Decision-making is rarely evidence-based. Research needs to be 
embedded into practice early on. A research foundation is needed to understand the contexts in which 
radicalisation seems to flourish (and where its risks are diminished), and what helps offenders to 
reintegrate into society. Risk assessments must be subject to robust empirical evaluation and compared 
with other types of risk management practices to determine what methods and approaches are most 
effective. Staff training also needs to be evaluated, with attention paid to whether it improves staff-
prisoner relationships alongside the ability to manage risks related to radicalisation. Information on 
evidence-based practices could be facilitated in the future through research partnerships.  
For 2017 the RAN P&P Working Group will have to prioritise these many challenges and address them 
through the knowledge and experience of prison and probation practitioners. The focus for the year will be 
on:  
 Dealing with increasing numbers of VEOs, especially returnees. What are the implications of this for 
regime choices and intervention programmes? The growing numbers also mean there will be more 
experience and practice to share, which will make it possible to sharpen the recommendations presented 
in this paper.  
 The role of probation, also in light of shorter sentences and alternative sentencing.  
 The role of religion in day-to-day work with VEOs, but also in specialised exit programmes.  
 
This paper will be updated at the end of 2017 to include new insights from research and practice. 
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